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Employée Ownership 
and Attitudes toward the Union 
An Empirical Study 
Richard J. Long 
This article explores the relationship between employée 
ownership and attitudes toward the union by reporting the 
results of an empricial study of a unionized Canadian trucking 
company recently pur chas ed from it s former corporate owner 
by most of its workers and managers. Results indicated that 
most workers — both union and non-union — dit not believe 
that unionization was either incompatible with employée 
ownership or unnecessary. 
North America is currently experiencing a résurgence of interest in 
and formation of business enterprises which are partly or completely 
owned by their employées. Seen by some as an important solution 
to problems which they see facing current industrial society — such as 
widespread worker disastisfaction and aliénation, and declining product-
ivity1 — the phenomenon has received added impetus from récent 
U.S. législation (Employée Retirement Income Security Act, 1974) 
which encourages, through tax incentives, the graduai conversion of 
conventional corporations to employée ownership. According to U.S. 
Internai Revenue Service figures, more than 370 U.S. businesses had 
embarked on this process by early 1977.2 Although not supported by 
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 See Paul DERRICK and J. F. PHIPPS (eds), Co-ownership, Co-operaîion 
and Control: An Industrial Objective New York, Longmans Green and Co., 1977; 
or J. VANEK (ed), Self-Management : Economie Liberation of Man, Baltimore, Penguin 
Education, 1975. 
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 Cited in Michael CONTE and Arnold TANNENBAUM, Employée Owner-
ship, Report to Economie Development Administration, United States Department of 
Commerce, June, 1977. 
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législation in Canada, such conversions are occurring there as well, 
although at a somewhat slower rate. 
Despite this, empirical research on the effects of such conversions 
is scanty. Although some research has recently been published on the 
effects of conversion to employée ownership on job attitudes and or-
ganizational performance,3 and on patterns of organizational influence,4 
little or no empirical research exists on the impact of employée 
ownership on the union and attitudes toward the union. 
This is a question of considérable importance since many of the 
firms currently converting or considering conversion to employée 
ownership are unionized. Union leaders, whose support for the con-
version may be crucial to its success, hâve been uncertain about the 
implications of the conversion for the union. As a resuit, many hâve 
been less than enthusiastic about such proposais and in some cases 
hâve been hostile towards their implementation. A common fear may 
be that such a move might reduce workers allegiance to the union, or 
may cause the workers to reject the union entirely. Furthermore, union 
leaders are often uncertain of just what the rôle of the union would be 
in an employee-owned enterprise. 
Thèse fears hâve generally not been allayed by proponents of the 
concept, who usually hâve little or nothing to say about the union in 
their conceputalizations of the «idéal type» of employée ownership. On 
the face of it, in a «pure case» of employée ownership, unionization 
gives rise to the rather ludicrous situation of employées bargaining 
with themselves. Put somewhat differently, the fundamental conflict of 
interests between labour and capital on which many labour theorists 
hâve based the need for labour unions would seem to disappear. How-
ever, thèse seemingly compelling arguments are criticized by some as 
being overly simplistic, and not taking into account the complexities 
of actual situations. Indeed, in numerous instances where unionized 
companies hâve converted to employée ownership they hâve remained 
unionized. 
3
 See Richard J. LONG, «The Effects of Employée Ownership on Orga-
nizational Identification, Job Attitudes, and Organizational Performance: A Tentative 
Framework and Empirical Findings,» Human Relations, Vol. 31, n° 1, 1978, pp. 29-48; and 
Richard J. LONG, «The Relative Effects of Ownership vs Control on Job Attitudes in an 
Employee-Owned Company,» Human Relations, 1979, in press. 
4
 Richard J. LONG, The Effects of Employée Ownership on Patterns of 
Organizational Influence and Worker Participation. Saskatoon, Canada, University 
of Saskatchewan, Collège of Commerce Working Paper, 1977. 
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However, as has been noted, there has been almost a complète 
lack of empirical research aimed at addressing thèse questions. This 
paper attempts to ameliorate this situation somewhat by reporting the 
results of exploratory empirical research at a unionized Canadian truck-
ing company recently purchased from its former corporate owner by 
most of its workers and managers. First, a number of attitudes toward 
the union, held by union members and non-union employées, are as-
sessed shortly after employée purchase. Attitudes assessed include 
such attitudes as perceived need for the union, perceived difficulty of 
remaining loyal to both the union and the company (rôle conflict), 
perceived goals and rôle of the union, and perceived compatibility of 
organizational and union goals. Thèse attitudes are assessed again about 
18 months after employée purchase, in order to test for possible changes 
over time. 
The second main objective of the study is to détermine if the atti-
tudes toward the union held by worker-owners differ from those held 
by workers who are not owners. If there are no significant différences 
between thèse two groups in attitudes toward the union, this would be 
strong évidence that share ownership does not affect thèse attitudes. 
However, if différences are found, the results are more ambiguous. We 
cannot necessarily assume that share ownership has caused union 
attitudes to change since the possibility that those employées who 
purchased company stock may hâve held différent attitudes toward 
the union prior to purchasing stock cannot be ruled out. Fortunately, 
this second situation did not generally occur. 
Finally, thèse questionnaire data will be supplemented by interview 
and other data. Thèse data will be used to help verify, interpret, and 
elaborate on inferences drawn from the questionnaire data. 
METHOD 
Research Site 
The research site is a medium-sized régional trucking company 
operating as a common carrier on routes in western Canada. The 
company employs about 160-170 full and part-time employées and 
currently has annual operating revenues of about five million dollars. 
The company's drivers and freight-handlers hâve been unionized for 
several years by a very large international union, and a «union shop» 
clause is now in effect. Prior to 1975 the company had lost more than 
$500,000 over the previous five years. 
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In May 1975 the firm was purchased from its former corporate 
owner by more than 70% of its workers and managers. The firm is 
wholly owned by its employées, and non-employees are not permitted 
to hold stock. The average initial investment ranged from $500 among 
non-managers to $5000 among senior managers. At employée purchase 
about 32% of company stock was held by top managers, middle managers 
held 14%, supervisors and foremen held 9%, and non-managers held 
45%. Since the company has a rather complex set of clauses written 
into its constitution to prevent concentration of ownership in any par-
ticular group, this distribution has not changed over time. 
Votes in electing the board of directors and profits are allocated 
according to number of shares held. Elected to the first board of direct-
ors were 3 senior managers, one middle manager, one supervisor, 
two truck drivers (one of them the union ship steward) and two outside 
directors. This same board was re-elected to a second year in 1976. The 
président of the company (who was the gênerai manager under corporate 
ownership) was elected chairman of the board. Directors meet monthly 
and receive a full set of financial statements prior to each meeting. 
AU shareholders receive a monthly profit and loss statement and letter 
from the président describing the notable events during the past 
month. 
Few personnel and structural changes hâve taken place subsé-
quent to employée takeover. Management (including top managers) are 
the same individuals as before employée takeover, as are most of the 
non-managers. The opérations, market, and structure of the company 
are largely unchanged, and the environment has not changed markedly. 
One notable change that has taken place has been a shift from a loss 
position to considérable profitability. For example, in the first six 
months of employée ownership share price rose 50%, and has continued 
to rise steadily since then. Members of the organization believe this is 
primarily due to increase motivation and coopération since employée 
purchase. 
One other apparent change is an improvement in both the 
employée-management and union-management relationships, which had 
been described as being very poor in the years immediately prior to 
employée takeover. This is further discussed later in the paper. 
More detailed information on the research site and data collection 
procédures than can be provided hère is available elsewhere.5 
5
 Richard J. LONG, The Effects of Employée Ownership on Job Attitudes 
and Organizational Performance : An Exploratory Study. Unpublished Ph. I). disserta-
tion, Cornell University, 1977. 
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Research Instruments and Data Collection 
Data on attitudes toward the union were collected primarily 
through two administrations of a comprehensive questionnaire : first at 
December 1975 (wave 1), about six months after employée purchase, 
and then at December 1976 (wave 2). Questionnaires were anonymous, 
and were either personally distnbuted by the researcher (who was not 
associated with management), distnbuted with the paychecks, or sent 
through inter-office mail. AH workers and managers (except the Compa-
ny président) received copies of the questionnaire. A cover letter on 
university letterhead asked respondents to either return the question-
naire to specified collection points on the company premises, or to mail 
the questionnaire directly to the researcher, located in a distant city, 
using stamped addressed envelopes which were available. 
The questionnaire included the following seven Likert-type items 
pertaining to union attitudes, with a response scale ranging from 1 (disa-
gree strongly) to 7 (agrée strongly) : 
(a) « A union is not really necessary in this firm at this time. » 
(b) « It is difficult to be loyal to the company and to the union. » 
(c) « Basically, the union and the management hâve similar goals. » 
(d) «The union works primarily for the best interests of its 
members. » 
(e) « There is no reason why the union and the management cannot 
work together. » 
(f) «Without a union, employées would probably not get a fair 
treatment from management. » 
(g) « The best way of obtaining workers say or influence in decision-
making in this film is through increasing the influence of the 
union. » 
Items (b) (c) and (e) were adapted from the Michigan Assessment of 
Organizations Package.6 
Item (a) attempted to as se s s the overall perceived need for a union. 
Item (b) dealt with the degree of rôle conflict experienced by the 
respondent. Items (c) and (d) dealt with perceived goals of the union 
and their compatibility with management goals. Item (e) sought the 
individual's assessment of the potential for co-opération between man-
agement and the union. Items (f) and (g) sought to clarify the perceived 
rôle of the union. Item (f) attempted to détermine whether the union 
6
 Michigan Organizational Assessment Package, Progress Report II, Ann 
Arbor, Mich., Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Research, The Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1975. 
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as deemed necessary to protect the workers from management — a 
distributive rôle in Walton and McKersie's terminology.7 Item (g) 
attempted to assess the degree to which respondents viewed the union 
as an appropriate channel for worker participation in décision-making 
— probably more of an integrative rôle than distributive. 
In order to supplément and avoid sole reliance on thèse question-
naire data, three periods of field work, totalling 13 weeks, were carried 
out over a period of 1 xk years. During this time informai interviews 
were conducted with ail senior managers and union officiais, and a 
substantial proportion of the other managers and employées, selected on 
a random basis. Extensive informai observation and examination of 
company records was also carried out. 
Respondents 
In the first wave questionnaires were received from 38 union 
members and 27 non-union non-managerial employées (managers are 
excluded from this analysis). The union members were comprised of 
truck drivers (65.8%) freight-handlers (13.2%) and a few supervisors and 
working foremen (13.2%). About 94.7% were full-time employées, 71% 
had been with the firm one year or longer, and 70.3% were share-
holders. Just under 40% had completed high school, 84.2% were mar-
ried, mean âge was 33 years, and ail were maie. 
The non-union employées were comprised primarily of secretarial 
or clérical personnel (70.4%) and maintenance mechanics (22.2%). 
About 85.2% were full-time employées, 63% had been with the firm 
one year or longer, and 70% were shareholders. S orne 59.2% had 
completed high school, 74.1% were married, mean âge was 30.1 years, 
and 77.8% were female. 
There were no appréciable différences between shareholders and 
non-shareholders in either group in terms of job type, full or part-time 
status, éducation, marital status, or sex, although non-shareholders 
tended to be slightly younger with a somewhat shorter length of service. 
In the second wave questionnaires were received from 32 union 
members and 24 non-union employées. Among both union members and 
non-union employées there were no significant différences in personal 
or job-related characteristics in comparison to wave 1 respondents. 
7
 R. E. WALTON and R. B. MCKERSIE, A Behavioral Theory of Labor 
Negotiations. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965. 
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However, among non-union employées déclines were noted in the pro-
portion who were full-time employées (85.2% to 70.8%) proportion who 
were stockholders (70.4% to 50%) and proportion married (74.1% to 
58.3%). Mean âge was also somewhat lower. 
Thèse changes in the non-union group should be borne in mind 
while interpreting longitudinal comparisons. If changes over time are 
found, it is possible that they are partly a reflection of the changed 
composition of the group. 
ATTITUDES OF UNION MEMBERS 
Six Months After Takeover 
Table 1 displays the responses of union members to the seven 
questions, as at wave 1. As can be seen, at this time less than one-
third feel that a union is unnecessary, although a fairly large additional 
number were undecided (21.6%). Interestingly, as Table 2 indicates, 
there is virtually no différence between union members who are share-
holders and those who are not, in terms of need for the union. 
TABLE 1 
Attitudes of Union Members, 
Wave 1 (N = 38) 
Statement Agrée Disagree Undecided 
a. A union is not really necessary in this firm at 
this time 32.4% 45.9% 21.6% 
b. It is difficult to be loyal to the company and 
to the union 29.7% 45.9% 24.3% 
c. Basically, the union and management hâve 
similar goals 35.1% 37.8% 27.0% 
d. The union works primarily for the best interests 
ofits members 62.1% 29.7% 8.1% 
e. There is no reason why the union and manage-
ment cannot work together 80.6% 8.4% 11.1% 
f. Without a union, employées would probably 
not get fair treatment from management 21.6% 56.7% 21.6% 
g. The best way of obtaining worker say or 
influence in decision-making in this firm is 
through increasing the influence of the union 10,8% 70.2% 18.9% 
TABLE 2 
Attitudes by Share Ownership Status, Union Members 
Wave 1 Wave 2 
Variable 
a. Need for union3 
b. Difficulty of dual loyalty 
c. Similarity of goals 
d. Union works for members 
e. Nothing to prevent union-management 
co-operation 
f. Would be treated unfairly without union 
g. Union best way of increasing worker 
influence in décisions 
Stockholders Non Shareholders Stockholders Non Shareholders 
(N = = 26) (N = 11) t (N = 19) (N = 13) 
Mean cr Mean a Mean & Mean a t 
4.15 1.89 4.27 1.79 0.18 3.95 2.01 4.92 1.94 1.37 
3.42 1.79 4.27 1.68 1.34 3.42 1.71 3.69 1.89 0.42 
3.54 1.61 4.27 1.49 1.30 4.05 1.62 4.15 1.57 0.18 
4.38 2.00 4.73 1.42 0.51 3.95 1.51 4.69 1.70 1.30 
5.56 1.23 5.64 1.43 0.16 5.79 0.71 6.15 0.38 1.88 
2.96 1.64 3.64 1.50 1.17 3.05 1.78 4.15 1.86 1.69= 
2.50 1.42 3.00 1.67 0.93 2.74 1.45 3.46 1.66 1.31 
* P < .10, two tailed 
** p < .05, two tailed 
*** P < .01, two tailed 
a
 This item has been reversed so that a higher numeric value indicates a higher perceived need for union. 
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In terms of rôle conflict, under 30% feel that is difficult to be 
loyal to both the union and to the company. As can be seen from 
Table 2, shareholders actually found it somewhat less difficult to be 
loyal to both than did non-shareholders, although this différence does 
not reach statistical significance (p < .19). A possible clue to this 
relatively low level of rôle conflict might be found in the next question, 
where only a minority of union members (37.8%) believed that the 
union and management do not hâve similar goals. Stockholders were 
somewhat less likely to believe that the goals were similar, but this 
différence did not approach statistical significance (p < .20). In terms 
of perceived union goals, 62.1% believed that the union works for 
the best interests of its members, with no différences between share-
holders and non-shareholders. 
Possibly partly as a resuit of not perceiving dissimilar goals, 
an overwhelming majority (82.1%) believed that «there is no reason why 
the union and management cannot work together». There was no 
différence between shareholders and non-shareholders in strength of 
this belief. 
In terms of instrumentality of the union, only 21.6% agreed that 
employées would probably not get fair treatment without a union; 
shareholders held this belief slightly more strongly. On the other hand, 
the union was definitely not viewed as an appropriate channel for worker 
participation in décision-making ; only 10.8% agreed that the best way 
of obtaining worker say or influence is through increasing the influence 
of the union. 
In sum, at wave 1 union members seemed to believe that unioni-
zation was not at ail incompatible with employée ownership, and report-
ed relatively little difficulty in being loyal to the company and the union. 
Share ownership or the lack of it did not seem to affect attitudes at ail. 
Eighteen Months After Takeover 
Table 3 compares attitudes at wave 2 to those at wave 1. As 
can be seen, there hâve been no significant changes in attitudes. The 
only change of any note is a tendency for a stronger belief that the 
union and the management can work together. 
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TABLE 3 
Longitudinal Comparison of Attitudes, 
Union Members 
Wave 1 
Variable (N - 38) 
Mean a 
a. Need for union 4.19 1.84 
b. Difficulty of dual loyalty 3.68 1.78 
c. Similarity of goals 3.76 1.59 
d. Union works for members 4.49 1.84 
e. Nothing to prevent union-
management co-operative 5.58 1.27 
f. Would be treated unfairly 
without union 3.16 1.61 
g- Union best way of increasing 
worker influence in décisions 2.65 1.50 
* p < .10, two tailed 
** p < .05, two tailed 
*** p < .01, two tailed 
Table 2 included a comparison of the attitudes of shareholders 
and non-shareholders at wave 2. As can be seen, there are still no 
significant différences between shareholders and non-shareholders on 
five of the seven questions, including perceived need for the union. 
However, non-shareholders now believe significantly more strongly 
than shareholders that there is « no reason why the union and manage-
ment cannot work together» and that employées would probably not 
get faire treatment without a union (p's < .10). 
ATTITUDES OF NON-UNION EMPLOYEES 
Six Months After Takeover 
Table 4 displays the responses of non-union employées to the 
seven questions, as at wave 1. As can be seen, even among this group 
less than half (48.1%) believed that a union is unnecessary. As was 
the case for union members, there is no significant différence in per-
ceived need for union between shareholders and non-shareholders at 
wave 1, as indicated by Table 5. 
Wave 2 
(N = 32) 
Mean <T = 
4.34 2.01 0.33 
3.53 1.76 0.34 
4.09 1.57 0.88 
4.25 1.61 0.57 
5.94 0.62 1.48 
3.50 1.87 0.81 
3.03 1.56 1.04 
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TABLE 4 
Attitudes of Non-Union Employées, 
Wave 1 (N = 32) 
Statement 
a. A union is not really necessary in this firm 
at this time 
b. It is difficult to be loyal to the company 
and to the union 
c. Basically, the union and management hâve 
similar goals 
d. The union works primarily for the best 
interests of its members 
e. There is no reason why the union and 
management cannot work together 
f. Without a union, employées would 
probably not get fair treatment from 
management 7.4% 70.3% 22.2% 
g. The best way of obtaining worker say 
or influence in decision-making in this firm 
is through increasing the influence of the 
union 3.7% 66.6% 29.6% 
Agrée Disagree Undecid» 
48.1% 22.2% 29.6% 
29.6% 40.7% 29.6% 
37.0% 37.0% 25.9% 
48.1% 33.3% 18.5% 
80.7% 11.5% 7.7% 
In terms of rôle conflict, less than 30% believe that it would be 
difficult to be loyal to both the union and management, with no dif-
férences between shareholders and nonshareholders. Only a minority 
(37%) believe that the union and management do not hâve similar 
goals, and the great majority (80.7%) believe that there is no reason 
why the union and management cannot work together. On neither of 
thèse questions are there différences between shareholders and non-
shareholders. In terms of perceived union goals, a little less than half 
(48.1%) believed that «the union works primarily for the best interests 
of its members. » However, this belief was significantly stronger among 
non-shareholders (p < .01) than shareholders. 
In terms of instrumentality of the union, only 2 individuals 
(7.4%) believed that employées would not get fair treatment without 
the union. This belief tended to be stronger among non-shareholders, 
but this différence did not reach statistical significance (p < .13). Only 
one individual (3.2%) agreed that increasing the influence of the union 
was the best way of increasing worker influence in this firm, and there 
was no différence between shareholders and non-shareholders. 
TABLE 5 
Attitudes by Share Ownership Status, Non-union Employés 
Wave 1 Wave 2 
Stockholders Non-Shareholders Stockholders Non Shareholders 
(N = 19) (N = = 8) t (N = H) (N = = H) 
Variable mean cr mean a mean cr mean a 
a. Need for union 3.16 1.64 3.50 1.31 0.52 4.27 2.10 4.36 1.29 0 
b. Difficulty of dual loyalty 3.79 1.78 3.88 1.46 0.12 4.45 2.02 3.91 1.30 0 
c. Similarity of goals 3.79 1.58 4.00 1.77 0.30 3.36 1.57 3.82 1.08 0 
d. Union works for members 3.63 1.54 5.50 0.76 3.25*** 3.73 1.85 4.09 1.22 X) 
e. Nothing to prevent union-
management co-operation 5.00 1.88 5.63 1.06 0.87 4.64 1.96 5.55 1.64 1 
f. Would be treated unfairly without 
union 2.32 1.20 3.13 1.25 1.58 3.45 2.07 3.18 1.40 0 
g- Union best way of increasing 
worker influence in décisions 2.32 1.42 2.88 0.99 1.01 2.27 1.19 3.73 0.91 3 
p < .10, two tailed 
p < .05, two tailed 
p < .01, two tailed 
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In sum, the attitudes of thèse non-union employées are strikingly 
similar to those of the union members. They seem to perceive little 
incompatibility between employée ownership and unionization an 
relatively little difficulty in being loyal to the company and the union. 
Share ownership seems to hâve had little effect on most attitudes. 
Eighteen Months After Takeover 
Table 6 compares attitudes at wave 2 to those at wave 1. As can 
be seen, significant changes hâve taken place in three of the seven 
attitudes. The belief that a union is necessary grew significantly (p < .05) 
stronger during the twelve months since wave 1, with the proportion 
believing that a union is not necessary declining from 48.1% to 33.4%. 
Consistent with this, the perceived instrumentality of the union in-
creased significantly (p < .10) with the proportion believing that em-
ployées would not get fair treatment without a union increasing from 
7.4% to 25.1%. Finally, the belief that the union is not an appropriate 
channel through which to expand worker influence weakened significant-
ly (p < .10). The proportion disagreeing with the statement «the best 
way of obtaining worker say... is through the union» dropped from 
66.6% to 41.7%; however, the proportion agreeing only increased 
from 3.7% to 8.3%. 
TABLE 6 
Longitudinal Comparison of Attitudes, 
Non-union Employées 
Wave 1 Wave 2 
(N = 27) (N = 24) t 
Variable mean a- mean CT 
a. Need for union 3.26 1.53 4.33 1.69 2.38** 
b. Difficulty of dual loyalty 3.81 1.67 4.29 1.65 1.02 
c. Similarity of goals 3.85 1.61 3.75 1.39 0.24 
d. Union works for members 4.19 1.59 3.91 1.51 0.62 
e. Nothing to prevent union-
management co-operation 5.19 1.67 5.17 1.76 0.05 
f. Would be treated unfairly 
without union 2.56 1.25 3.33 1.71 1.87* 
g- Union best way of increasing 
worker influence in décisions 2.48 1.31 3.13 1.30 1.76* 
* p < .10, twotailed 
** p < .05, two tailed 
*** p < .01, twotailed 
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There are no différences between shareholders and nonshare-
holders in six of the seven attitudes at wave 2, as has been indicated 
in Table 5. However, non-shareholders show significantly less disagree-
ment (p < .01) than shareholders that the union is the best way of 
increasing worker influence in décisions. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
There are several inferences that might be drawn from thèse data. 
First, not only do the great majority of both union members and non-
union employées believe that the union is compatible with employée 
ownership, only minorities in each group feel that a union is unne-
cessary. Among union members less than one-third believed a union 
unnecessary shortly after employée takeover, and this proportion 
remained stable one year later. Among non-union employées, the 
proportion believing the union unnecessary actually declined from less 
than one-half to about one-third. 
Furthermore, even among shareholders, only minorities of union 
members and non-union employées believed it difficult to be loyal to 
both the union and the company. Perhaps part of the reason was that 
only a minority of respondents believed that the union and management 
did not hâve similar goals. 
This finding is also consistent with Whyte's contention, based on 
an extensive review of research, that a high loyalty to the company 
does not necessarily imply a lowered loyalty to the union. In fact, 
he found the reverse to be generally true, with employées expressing 
high loyalty and satisfaction with the company also expressing high 
loyalty and satisfaction with the union.8 
An important and somewhat surprising finding was that indi-
vidual share ownership did not seem to hâve significant effects on 
attitudes toward the union, either in the short or the longer run, as 
indicated by the lack of significant différences in union attitudes between 
shareholders and nonshareholders. This apparent lack of effect is par-
ticularly interesting because significant différences between shareholders 
and nonshareholders were found to exist in other job attitudes, notably 
organizational identification and job satisfaction, in analysis not de-
scribed hère.9 
8
 William F. WHYTE, Men At Work, Homewood, ILL. : Richard D. Irwin, 
1961, pp. 294-295. 
9
 Non-managerial shareholders were found to be significantly higher than 
non-shareholders in terms of organizational intégration, involvement, and commitment 
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In terms of the rôle of the union, it is quite clear that the union 
is not viewed as an appropriate way of increasing worker influence in 
décisions. On the other hand, the union was not viewed as necessary 
to prevent the employées from being treated unfairly by management. 
Yet, respondents did not feel the union was unnecessary. What, then, 
is the perceived rôle of the union ? 
Interviews were conducted with union members in an attempt to 
clarify this. The overall consensus seemed to be that although présent 
management did tend to treat employées fairly, it was felt désirable 
to maintain the union as a safeguard, should this situation change. They 
felt that having the union would ensure that wages would be at least 
comparable with those of other firms. One of those interviewed was 
a worker-director, a truck driver, who believed the union was necessary 
«to keep wages fair and provide job security.» Thus, it appears that 
employées are not confident of their ability to influence wage décisions 
without the possibility of having additional help available from the 
union.10 
However, the impact of the conversion on union power is more 
problematic. In interviews, some employées expressed a concern that 
«many [employées] feel that they can't strike if they hâve money 
invested or they are hurting their investment.» On the other hand, 
several employées pointed out that the amount of income that they 
received through dividends and share appréciation was small compared 
to their wage income, and asked «why should we receive lower wages 
just because we are shareholders?» Indeed, perhaps reflecting this 
attitude, in negotiations which took place about fourteen months after 
(p's < .01), and gênerai satisfaction (p < .05). See LONG, «The Effects of Employée 
Ownership on Organizational Identification, Job Attitudes, and Organizational Perform-
ance,» op. cit. for further détails. 
10
 This surmise is supported by data discussed elsewhere, which indicated that 
«while employée ownership may hâve increased both total [organizational] influence 
and workers' participation... power-equalization has not occurred since the influence 
of managers has increased to a greater extent than that of non-managers.» If workers 
perceive this to be the case, then they could be expected to retain the union as a counter-
weight to the power of management. It may also be germane to note hère that, other 
than through représentation on the board of directors, no formai or informai mechanisms 
(eg. a workers council) hâve been established to increase worker participation in 
décisions. Thus, mechanisms which could potentially «compete» with the union, in 
terms of représentation of workers, are not well-developed. This is particularly true 
for nonshareholders, who hâve no formai mechanisms at ail for influencing manage-
ment. See LONG, «The Effects of Employée Ownership on Patterns of Organizational 
Influence and Worker Participation», op. cit. for further détails. 
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employée takeover (in fall, 1976) the union membership unanimously 
voted to reject management's «final offer», which was comparable 
to settlements reached at competitors. As a pre-condition to a légal 
strike a provincial conciliât or was called in and filed a report. Manage-
ment subsequently raised its offer slightly, and this new offer was 
accepted by the union membership. 
The above incident notwithstanding, the change in ownership 
appears to hâve had a bénéficiai effect on uni on-management relations, 
which are now quite good, according to both the union business agent 
and the company président. As an example, in 1976 the union pro-
cès sed only one grievance against management, and this was settled by 
mutual agreement early in the grievance procédure. This is in sharp 
contrast to the years prior to employée purchase. 
At least part of this improvement, according to the union business 
agent, is due to the increased openness and honesty of management 
since employée ownership. Moreover, detailed financial information 
(provided to ail directors every month) is now available to the union 
through the union members on the board of directors, as is other 
operating information. This free flow of information tends to reduce 
the mistrust which often arises in situations where management attempts 
to withhold such information. 
The improved union-management relationship may also be a 
reflection of the improved relationship between managers and em-
ployées, which had been extremely poor prior to employée purchase. 
Communication, trust, and coopération between managers and em-
ployées hâve increased, as has job satisfaction, while turnover has 
declined as much as 30%. Employée ownership appears to hâve been 
at least partly responsible for thèse improvements. n 
In sum, then, in this case unionization is not only seen by em-
ployées — shareholders and nonshareholders — as compatible with 
employée ownership, but also only a minority feel it is unnecessary. 
Furthermore, employée ownership may even hâve improved the union-
management relationship by promoting greater openness on the part 
of management and by improving employée-management relations. 
Somewhat surprisingly, individual share ownership apparently had little 
effect on attitudes toward the union. In terms of union power, the 
11
 See LONG, The Effects of Employée Ownership on Job Attitudes and 
Organizational Performance: An Exploratory Study, op. cit. for analysis supporting this. 
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implications are less clear, but it does seem likely that while union 
members would support wage demands which are comparable to or 
slightly above levels prevailing at comparable firms, it seems unlikely 
that they would support union demands which would adversely affect 
the firm's vaibility — such as exorbitant wage demands, or restrictive 
work practices. In addition, they seem favorably disposed to co-opera-
tion between management and the union. 
Overall, thèse results seem to indicate that the worst fears of 
union leaders will not necessarily be realized, and that a rôle for the 
union may continue to be perceived by employées. This will probably 
be particularly true if power imbalances between management and 
workers are perceived to exist. It is conceivable, however, that the 
rôle of the union may become somewhat less adversarial and more 
integrative in nature. 
However, as in any study of an exploratory nature, some caveats 
on the validity and generalizability of the findings should be noted. 
First, it would hâve been désirable to hâve been able to obtain ques-
tionnaire measures of attitudes prior to the ownership change, which 
was not possible hère. Second, the research site may possess rather 
unique characteristics which may inhibit generalizability of thèse 
findings. For example, in this case unionization is necessary to make 
deliveries to one of the firm's major customers, and some employées 
are aware of this. As another example, perhaps in a situation more 
closely approaching the idéal of employée ownership — where power-
equalization between managers and workers has taken place — less 
need for a union would be perceived. However, it should be noted 
that, relative to other employée owned firms currently in existence, 
the research site used hère probably approaches this idéal more closely 
than most. In addition, the nature and the size of this firm might also 
be important. Finally, since this study took place during a period 
relatively shortly after employée purchase, the effects of employée 
ownership over the very long run remain to be seen. 
Therefore, in view of the current paucity of empirical research 
on this issue, much further research, particularly longitudinal research, 
needs to be conducted in a variety of settings before firm conclusions 
can be drawn. 
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L'entreprise, propriété des salariés 
et les attitudes envers le syndicat 
Bien que l'Amérique du Nord connaisse un regain d'intérêt pour la for-
mation d'entreprises qui soient partiellement ou totalement la propriété des 
employés, il n'existe à peu près pas d'études concrètes sur les répercussions 
de cette forme de propriété sur les syndicats et sur les dispositions des tra-
vailleurs-propriétaires envers le syndicat. Cette étude veut combler cette lacu-
ne. Elle donne les résultats d'une enquête auprès du personnel d'une entreprise 
de transport, où existait un syndicat, qui fut achetée par ses salariés et ses 
cadres. 
Aux fins de cette enquête, on a utilisé deux questionnaires comprenant 
sept attitudes ou réactions possibles des travailleurs à l'endroit du syndicat 
six mois et dix-huit mois après l'achat de l'entreprise. Les résultats indiquent 
que la plupart des salariés, qu'ils soient ou non membres du syndicat, ne 
croyaient pas que la syndicalisation étaient incompatible avec ce type de 
propriété et une minorité d'entre eux seulement estimaient que le syndicat 
n'était pas nécessaire. Ce qui est plutôt surprenant, il y avait peu de différence 
entre les attitudes des salariés-propriétaires et ceux qui ne l'étaient pas. Ces 
dispositions d'esprit ont peu changé avec le temps. Bien que cela ne soit pas 
absolument clair, le rôle du syndicat, tel qu'il est perçu par les salariés, est 
d'être un chien de garde destiné à faire contrepoids au pouvoir possiblement 
accru de la direction. 
De l'enquête, il ressort aussi que l'achat de l'entreprise par les employés 
a eu une influence bénéfique sur les relations professionnelles, influence 
attribuable à une information plus considérable et à une plus grande ouverture 
d'esprit de la part de la direction ainsi qu'à des rapports plus harmonieux 
entre les parties. Cependant, les répercussions sur le rôle futur du syndicat 
dans l'entreprise apparaissaient moins clairement. 
L'auteur conclut en signalant les limites de l'enquête et en insistant 
sur la nécessité d'une recherche plus approfondie dans un plus grand nombre 
d'établissements pour en arriver à une compréhension meilleure de l'influence 
de ce type d'entreprises sur les syndicats. 
